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Belief in occurrence is theorized to play a central role in remembering autobiographical events. 
Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) proposed that belief in occurrence also plays a key role in 
determining the “realness” of future events, or the subjective sense that imagined future events 
will genuinely occur. They reported data indicating that belief in occurrence for future events 
arises from the contextualization of imagined future events within autobiographical knowledge, 
and that such belief signals when simulated events are consistent with expectations and goals. 
The validity of their findings can be questioned due to the use of a single item to measure belief 
in occurrence. To further validate these propositions, we expanded an existing belief in 
occurrence scale to create parallel forms for measuring belief in occurrence for past and future 
events. In Study 1 (N = 470) participants rated three past or three future events (recent, distant, 
uncertain). Study 2 (N = 251) replicated Study 1 using French translations of the measures and a 
within-subjects design in which participants rated a past and a future event. Confirmatory 
structural modelling indicated that an eight-item belief in occurrence scale was a strong fit to the 
data, and that item loadings were invariant across event cues and temporal direction for belief in 
occurrence, spatial characteristic, and autonoetic awareness latent variables. These studies 
support the view that belief in occurrence appraisals for past and future events draw on 
overlapping processes. Relationships between the latent variables and other predictors of 
remembering / forecasting events are discussed.  
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Many memory scientists agree that the retrieval of past events reflects constructive 
processes (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1967; Schacter & Addis, 2007) and that the experience of 
remembering is informed by metacognitive appraisals (Cabeza & Moskovitch, 2013; Rubin, 
2006). One important metacognitive appraisal is belief in occurrence, which is the appraisal that 
an event genuinely occurred to the self in the past (Scoboria et al., 2014). While research on 
belief in occurrence has typically focused on memory for past events, the current study extends 
this notion of belief to future events: the belief that an imagined event will genuinely occur to the 
self in the future. Although beliefs about past and future events differ in epistemic status (as the 
past has gone and the future has yet to happen; Perrin, 2016), future-oriented thoughts are 
associated, in varying degrees, with a subjective sense that imagined events will (or will not) 
materialize in the future (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017). The present study aims to develop a 
novel measure of this belief and to examine whether belief in occurrence for past and future 
events draw on overlapping processes.  
Beliefs in occurrence for past events 
Scoboria et al. (2014) defined recollection as the experience of mental simulation for an 
event accompanied by a sense of re-experiencing the past, and belief in occurrence as an 
attribution of an event to genuine occurrence, the self, and the past. Numerous researchers have 
observed that when events are recollected, they are also typically believed to have genuinely 
occurred (e.g., Brewer, 1996; James, 1890; Pillemer, 1998; Tulving, 1983). This is also the 
implicit assumption in most memory research. However, this is not always the case. For 
example, in a series of studies (among others, see Mazzoni, Scoboria & Harvey, 2010; Otgaar, 
Scoboria & Mazzoni, 2014) it has been documented that people might remember very well 
personal events, that, however, they no longer believe to have happened to them. These 
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‘nonbelieved memories’ (Mazzoni et al., 2010) have been found to be very similar to mental 
representations of past events that are still believed to have happened, as they evoke the same 
level of recollective experience (participants claim to be able to travel back in time, relive the 
event and re-experience the same emotions), even if they have decided, on the basis of external 
evidence, that the event had not happened to them.  
The phenomenon of nonbelieved memories highlights that belief in the occurrence of past 
events is a metacognitive appraisal that needs to be distinguished from the appraisal of 
recollection. These two forms of appraisals arise from distinct underlying processes and can be 
experimentally dissociated (Scoboria, et al., 2014). Although belief in occurrence for past events 
is typically high, degrees of belief can vary substantially across memories and the strength of 
belief and strength of recollection are predicted by different covariates (e.g., belief in occurrence: 
event plausibility and social feedback; recollection: spatial/perceptual mental simulation and 
feelings of re-experiencing the past; Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016; Scoboria, 
Talarico & Pascal, 2015).  
Why is belief in occurrence important? For nonbelieved memories, even if the mental 
representation is very vivid and memory-like, what is missing, compared to believed memories, 
is the sense that the event in the mental representation belongs to one’s personal past, is part of 
one’s experiences. And the sense that a memory is part of one’s genuine experience is after all 
the essence of memory.  
In addition, several studies have found that it is the belief in occurrence, not the memory 
per se, that affects cognition and behavior. Typically, studies have shown that retrieving believed 
memories can have subsequent behavioral consequences. In other words, future behavior can be 
influenced by the retrieval of related autobiographical events (e.g., see Biondolillo & Pillemer, 
VALIDATING BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE FOR FUTURE EVENTS… 6 
 
2015, for effects on physical exercise; and Selimbegović, Régner, Huguet, & Chatard, 2016, for 
effects of recalling memories of success and failure on spatial and verbal ability). However, in 
these studies it was the belief that mattered, as behavior was changed independently of whether 
the events were objectively true or false. In addition, it has been shown that retrieving 
nonbelieved memories experimentally created in the lab makes people behave differently in 
cognitive tasks compared to when the same memories are believed in (Mazzoni, 2015). In other 
words, people tend to base their thinking and behavior on events that they believe to have 
occurred, regardless of whether the mental representation for the events is accompanied by 
recollection. Other examples show that falsely believing to have fallen ill on a specific food lead 
to changes in food preference and food avoidance (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Bernstein, 
Scoboria & Arnold, 2015; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry & Bernstein, 2012). Thus, examining the 
role of belief in occurrence in memory is crucial to understand the effect of the memory on 
people’s experience and behavior. 
Beliefs in the occurrence of future events  
Episodic future thinking—the ability to mentally simulate possible future events 
(Szpunar, 2010)—represents an interesting case for understanding the role of belief in 
occurrence for two reasons. One is the similarity between the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
involved in remembering past events and in envisioning future events (e.g., McDermott & 
Guilmore, 2015; Schacter, Benoit & Szpunar, 2017). There is substantial agreement that, 
similarly to past memories, the effective anticipation of future events is predicated on flexible 
cognitive systems that are capable of recombining information from prior experiences and other 
knowledge resulting in plausible and realistic mental simulations of future events (the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010), and that 
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the recall of past events and imagining of future events draw on a common capacity for mental 
simulation (Buckner & Caroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
The second is that an important component in imagining the future is the extent to which 
envisioned events will be indeed part of a person’s future (D’Argembeau, 2016). Similarly to 
past memories, it is the degree to which a future event is believed to occur that makes the event 
part of a person’s future. Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017), for example, proposed that mental 
simulations are associated, in varying degrees, with a subjective sense of belief that the imagined 
event will occur in the future. They further proposed that, similar to belief in occurrence 
appraisals for past events (Scoboria et al., 2014), belief in occurrence for future events reflects 
metacognitive appraisals based on phenomenological experience, the information available at the 
time(s) that future events are imagined, and other relevant knowledge.  
The notion of belief in the occurrence of future events is intriguing. It presumes that the 
type(s) of mental experience(s) associated with event occurrence can be associated with 
simulations of events that are known to not yet have happened. Belief in occurrence is thought to 
convey a sense of personal ‘truth’ or subjective veridicality to past events. As noted above, 
Scoboria et al. (2014) defined belief in occurrence for past events as the attribution of an event to 
self, past, and actual occurrence. The ‘self’ facet is presumably similar when imagining future 
personal events. The temporal attribution is easily modified to ‘future’ or ‘known to have not yet 
have occurred’. This leaves the ‘actual occurrence’ component, which is necessarily 
conceptually different for future events due to this knowledge that the event has yet to happen. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility to attribute the experience of veridicality that 
comes with belief in occurrence to mental representations of future events (see Arango-Muñoz & 
Michaelian, 2014, and Moulin & Souchay, 2014, for further discussion of ‘epistemic feelings’ 
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that contribute to the experience of remembering). Feelings associated with events appearing 
‘genuine’ or ‘true’ may be present when future events are contemplated.  
Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) reported data which extended the empirical distinction 
between recollection and belief in occurrence to future event representations. In sum, they 
provided the first evidence that people think of future events in terms of degrees of belief that 
they will occur, and do use “belief in the possibility of occurrence” when appraising events that 
might occur in the future. Based on their findings, Ernst and D’Argembeau proposed that belief 
in future occurrence is related to the integration of future events within a broader 
autobiographical context, and specifically to personal goals, the relationship of simulated future 
events to other events in memory, knowledge of self and others, and the plausibility of potential 
future events. They suggested that “belief in the occurrence of future events may mainly rely on 
their personal plausibility and consistency with our knowledge and expectations about ourselves 
and our life” (pp 1046-47). They reported quantitative (ratings of events) and qualitative data 
(reports about justifications for belief in past and future events), which replicated previous 
findings regarding the relationship between autobiographical belief and recollection for past 
events (Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016), and indicated similar relationships for 
belief in occurrence and autonoetic awareness when people contemplate future events.  
The present study 
In order to shed further light on the notion of belief in future occurrence and to advance its 
measurement, we aim to address a number of methodological limitations in Ernst and 
D’Argembeau (2017). While a reasonable amount of work has been done on scale development 
and establishing the validity of belief in occurrence for past events (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2004; 
Scoboria et al., 2013; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016; Scoboria, Talarico & Pascal, 2015), Ernst and 
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D’Argembeau (2017) was the first systematic effort to examine belief in occurrence for future 
events (but see Scoboria & Wilson, 2011, for a discussion of belief in occurrence in the context 
of imagining future gambling wins for problem gamblers). Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) used 
a single item to measure belief in occurrence for past and future events, with different item 
wording to reflect temporal direction (i.e., While remembering/imagining this event, I feel that it 
actually occurred/will actually occur). Given this use of a single item to measure belief in 
occurrence, little can be said about the reliability or validity of the future occurrence measure, or 
the comparative validity of the belief in occurrence for past and future events. Hence it remains 
empirically untested if measuring belief in occurrence for past and future events involves 
essentially the same underlying construct, or whether there are fundamental differences in the 
processes that influence ratings for each.  
A second issue with the findings in Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) is that they reported 
that event plausibility was related to belief in occurrence for future but not past events. Event 
plausibility is conceptually distinct from belief in occurrence, and reflects an appraisal of the 
possibility that an event could have occurred in the past (Scoboria et al., 2004); or in the case of 
future events, the possibility that an event could in principle occur in the future. Plausibility has 
been long identified as an important component of event memory (Scoboria et al., 2004). 
Plausibility is a contextual variable which reflects the integration of autobiographical knowledge, 
knowledge about an event, and knowledge of what can and cannot occur in the world (Blank, 
2016). Plausibility can be measured at different levels of specificity. General plausibility is a 
judgment regarding the ontological status of events; it is the degree to which an individual 
believes that an event can occur to people in general. People also hold beliefs about the 
plausibility of an event for particular subgroups, which has been labelled 'cultural plausibility’ 
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(Mazzoni, Loftus & Kirsch, 2001). Personal plausibility refers to an individual's judgment that 
an event can occur to the self (see Scoboria et al., 2004), and is the type of plausibility that has 
most frequently been measured in studies of autobiographical memory.  It has been established 
that small changes in plausibility can potentiate the development of belief in the occurrence for 
false events (Mazzoni, Loftus & Kirsch, 2001). More generally, the level of plausibility 
constrains the degree to which an event is believed to have occurred (Scoboria et al., 2004), with 
the consequence that the belief rating for an event is typically lower than the plausibility rating 
for the same event (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry & Shapero, 2012). However, appraisals of the 
plausibility of events are not fixed, and can increase or decrease when additional information 
about events is acquired (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2001; Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen & Fisico, 2007; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch & Jimenez, 2006).  
Because personal plausibility has been consistently related to belief in occurrence ratings 
for past events across numerous prior studies (e.g., McLelland, Devitt, Schacter & Addis, 2015; 
Scoboria et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria & Pascal, 2016; Scoboria & Talarico, 
2013), we wondered if in Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) the relations between belief in 
occurrence and plausibility may have been influenced by skew in the distribution of belief in 
occurrence ratings given that average ratings approached the scale ceiling. Negative skew in 
belief ratings is often observed in studies that cue for strongly believed, vivid memories, hence 
ceiling effects for occurrence ratings may have influenced why plausibility was not related to 
belief in occurrence for past events in their data (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). One method used 
to elicit events with ‘weaker’ associated autobiographical belief involves cueing for memories 
about which respondents are somehow “uncertain” (Scoboria, Talarico & Pascal, 2015). Most 
important for the current research, the measurement structure of scales of belief in occurrence 
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and recollection for past events have been found to be stable across different types of events and 
different cueing methods. 
Given the results of the limited previous research examining belief in occurrence for future 
events, the primary goal of the present research was to examine commonalities and differences 
between the measurement of belief in occurrence for past and future events. We explored the 
extent to which belief in occurrence attributed to past and future event representations might be 
thought to reflect similar underlying processes. We replicated and extended Ernst and 
D’Argembeau (2017), by expanding the number of items used to measure belief in occurrence, 
by attending to the potential influence of ceiling effects in the rating of belief in occurrence when 
cueing events, and by validating English and French versions of the measure. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to seek to validate a multiple-item belief in occurrence measure for future 
events. 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we expanded the conceptual breadth of an existing measure of belief in 
occurrence for past events (Scoboria et al., 2014), to create parallel forms for measuring belief in 
occurrence for past and future events. The past and future forms had similar item wordings with 
the exception of temporal reference. We addressed the issue of a “believed memory” bias when 
sampling events by cueing individuals to retrieve ‘events’ rather than ‘memories’ (Scoboria & 
Talarico, 2013), and by cueing for and assessing generalization across three different types of 
events (recent, distant, and uncertain). We included the ‘uncertain’ cue to increase variability in 
belief in occurrence ratings so that restricted range would be less likely to bias model solutions.  
We used confirmatory factor analytic statistical techniques to estimate the fit of items to 
theorized latent constructs (belief in occurrence, and key aspects of recollection including spatial 
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characteristics and autonoetic awareness [feelings of reexperiencing/pre-experiencing associated 
with events]), and tested whether the resulting measures showed structural model equivalence 
(that loadings of items on latent variables was statistically the same across latent variables), 
supporting the view that belief in occurrence for past and future events involve overlapping 
processes. We then examined the relationship among these latent variables and other predictors 
known to be relevant to remembering the past / forecasting the future, to further examine the 
validity of the measures. We anticipated replicating Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017), in which 
personal plausibility, event importance, location, and sensory details correlated with belief in 
occurrence for future events.  
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
 664 MTurk workers completed the online survey, 330 in the past and 334 in the future 
event condition (randomly assigned). Each received $1.00 USD as a token of appreciation for 
completing the study. Workers were eligible if they had not completed a similar study with 
Scoboria’s lab previously. 
Responses to the cues were reviewed (see below for the criteria), and 233 participants in 
the past condition and 237 participants in the future condition provided usable responses to all 
three events. Demographic characteristics for the final sample were: Mean age = 36.71 (SD = 
12.05), range 18 to 80; gender: 50.4% female, 45.2% male, 4.4% non-binary or not reported. 
Country of residence: 92.4% United States. Ethnicity: 6.2% Asian, 7.0% Black, 77.2% 
Caucasian, 5.5% Hispanic, 0.4% Native American, 3.7% mixed. 
Measures 
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 Events were rated on belief in occurrence (8 items), autonoetic awareness (4 items), 
spatial setting (4 items), and a number of single items: personal plausibility, visual detail, 
sensory detail, event importance and rehearsal. Past and future versions of each item were 
written that minimized wording differences. All items referred to ‘events’, and references to 
terms such as ‘memory’ and ‘imagination’ were minimized. 
To create the pool of belief in occurrence items, the initial items were taken from 
Scoboria et al. (2014) and Ernst and D’Argembean (2017), and new items were written. We 
created parallel versions of each item for rating past and future events, and minimized 
differences in wording between the past and future versions. The remaining items were taken 
from prior work on autobiographical memory and future thinking, and were similarly worded to 
create closely parallel versions for rating past and future events. The complete list of items is 
provided in Appendix A. The items were presented in a random order following each event cue. 
Procedure 
Interested MTurk workers were randomly directed to one of two online surveys, one 
which cued participants to recall past events and the other to imagine future events (participants 
could only access one of the two surveys). Participants read general instructions about retrieving 
events, and then described, dated, and rated three past or three future events that were presented 
in a fixed order (due to limitations in the survey software): a recent event (in the past year / in the 
next year), an uncertain event, and a distant event (5-10 years ago / in 5-10 years). The verbatim 
event cues are provided in Appendix B. 
Study 1 Results 
Event screening. Two raters were trained to independently code the events. The goal of 
screening was to remove any reports that referred to extended events, lifetime periods, repeated 
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events, or that did not refer to events at all. These and all exclusion criteria were set in advance. 
The raters coded the narratives as Specific, Extended, Non-specific, Repeated, or Invalid, and 
agreed on classification for 94% of past and 98% of future cases. Disagreements were resolved 
via discussion. 71% of participants provided three ‘specific’ events and were included in the 
analyses; see Table 1 for the number of valid events per cue. Using participants with three 
complete events allowed us to statistically model the three events simultaneously. We note that 
analyzing the events separately and including all participants with a valid response for that event 
did not notably alter the findings reported below. 
Primary Structural Equation Modelling Analyses 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test the latent structure of belief in 
occurrence, spatial, and autonoetic judgments for past and future events. CFA is a structural 
equation modeling (SEM) technique that requires one or more theoretical models be specified in 
advance of testing the fit of data to the model. Researchers define what factors will be present 
and onto which specific factor(s) indicators (items) will load. The data are then used to evaluate 
the extent to which the model explains covariance amongst the measured variables, resulting in 
an estimate of the degree to which the proposed theoretical model represents a good fit to the 
data. 
For the primary model, model fit was tested simultaneously across the three events 
(recent, uncertain, distant) and two temporal directions (past, future). Items were loaded onto 
belief in occurrence (8 items), spatial (4 items), and autonoetic (4 items) latent variables for each 
event type and within each temporal direction, resulting in 18 latent variables in total (3 events 
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by 2 temporal directions x 3 LVs)1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFAs) was performed in R 
(R Development Core Team, 2008) using the Lavaan package, version .5-22 (Rosseel, 2012). No 
problematic multivariate outliers were identified, and all cases were retained. 
 For past events, the initial model was a reasonably good fit to the data (robust CFI = .943; 
robust RMSEA = .047 [.038,.055]; SRMR = .064). Examination of factor loadings (see Table 2) 
indicated that all items loaded strongly and statistically significantly on their respective latent 
variables. Examination of the modification indices indicated that residual error for one belief in 
occurrence item (B7) tended to correlate with the residual errors for a number of the other belief 
items. Removal of this item resulted in improved model fit (robust CFI = .953; robust RMSEA = 
.033 [.029,.038]; SRMR = .063). For future events, the model with the 7-item belief scale was 
also a reasonably good fit to the data (robust CFI = .937; robust RMSEA = .051 [.047,.055]; 
SRMR = .056). To assist with clarity of comprehension for the model, see Figure 1 for a 
graphical representation of the resulting latent variables and correlations between LVs for one of 
the event cues (Future Recent). 
 To address the question whether the belief in occurrence measure was equivalent for past 
and future events, and whether the measure was equivalent across the three events, we fit a 
model with the belief in occurrence latent variables for the three events adding a constraint of 
group equivalence for loadings of indicators onto latent variables between past and future events, 
and between the recent, distant, and uncertain cues. The loadings were statistically equivalent, 
per the criteria described by Cheung and Rensvold (2002), who recommend a threshold of .01 or 
below for change in the CFI fit index; ΔCFI was .003 for the current model. The complete model 
                                                            
1 We also attempted to fit a ‘sensory’ latent variable, using the visual and sensory items. This LV fit well for the 
three past events in Study 1, but rendered the model non-identifiable when the future events were included in the 
model. The model was also underidentified when this LV was included for Study 2. See the general discussion for 
more on mental simulation and the need for additional items when estimating this ‘sensory’ latent variable. 
VALIDATING BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE FOR FUTURE EVENTS… 16 
 
described above (including belief in occurrence, spatial, and autonoetic LVs) also indicated 
model equivalence (ΔCFI = .003). These models show that the indicators of belief in occurrence, 
spatial characteristics, and autonoetic awareness had statistically equivalent loadings on latent 
variables across the three event cues for both past and future events. 
Relationships Between LVs and Single Item Covariates 
 Having established the latent structure of the belief in occurrence, autonoetic and spatial 
scales, we added the additional single items to the model (plausibility, rehearsal, visual, sensory, 
importance) to explore the relationships between the latent variables and these covariates. The 
single items were permitted to correlate in this model. Correlations between the latent variables 
are provided in Tables 3 and 4, and correlations between the single items covariates and latent 
variables are in Table 5. 
Belief in occurrence for future events correlated positively with importance, plausibility, 
spatial, and autonoetic variables for all three events, and with visual detail for the recent event. 
Belief in occurrence for past events correlated positively with the plausibility and spatial 
variables for all three events, and with autonoetic awareness for the distant event. These findings 
generally replicate Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017). 
Average item ratings  
 Mean ratings for the latent variables and the single items covariates are provided in 
Figure 2. The expected ceiling effect for belief in occurrence for past events was evident for the 
recent and distant event cues, and was not present for the uncertain event (also as expected). The 
item distribution was less of an issue for the future event cues, for which ratings did not approach 
the belief scale ceiling on average. We note that the robust estimation of model fit used for 
calculating model fit above corrects for this skewness in item distributions. 
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Belief in occurrence was rated lower on average for future events compared with past 
events. However, near future events tended to be rated high on belief in occurrence, raising the 
possibility that participants imagined and rated realistically anticipated near future events. All of 
the events were rated as fairly personally important, with the exception of ‘past uncertain’ 
events. Uncertain events were also characterized by lower ratings on predictors of recollection 
(i.e., spatial, visual, sensory details, autonoetic awareness). Future distant and future uncertain 
events showed a similar pattern of ratings. Overall, the pattern of differences between near and 
distant future events is consistent with previous findings (more sensory/contextual details and 
autonoetic awareness for near future events; see e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).2 
Ratings of plausibility were generally high, and event importance was rated high for all 
events excepting past uncertain. Future events were rated high on average on the rehearsal scale, 
further indicating that many of the future events had been previously constructed and thought 
about. The issue of retrieval of previously constructed future scenes and construction of novel 
future events is considered further in the general discussion.  
Study 1 Discussion 
In Study 1, we developed an expanded seven-item measure of belief in occurrence with 
parallel forms for rating past and future autobiographical events. Structural modelling indicated a 
robust belief in occurrence latent variable, which generalized across three event cues and two 
temporal directions. In addition, we also report simultaneously measuring robust latent variables 
for other important aspects of remembering / forecasting: spatial detail and autonoetic awareness.  
                                                            
2 While we planned to collect data on the dating of events, due to a programming error, when asked to record 
temporal distance for future events, participants in the future event group were provided the same prompt as for the 
past event group “how long ago did this event occur”. Many participants commented on being confused by the 
question, and the dating data provided for future events could not be used. The dates for past events were: Past 
Distant events, Average years = 14.98 (SD = 13.93), range 5 years to 56 years; Past Uncertain events, Average years 
= 7.39 (SD = 1.90 years), range 3 to 14 years; Past Recent events, Average days = 128 (SD = 105.53 days), range 1 
to 365 days. 
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Consistent with Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017), event importance and personal 
plausibility correlated with belief in occurrence for future events, supporting the notion that 
belief in occurrence for future events is rooted in the fit of potential events with autobiographical 
knowledge and personal goals.  Plausibility was more robustly related to belief in occurrence for 
past events than in Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017), which is more consistent with previous 
findings (Scoboria et al., 2004). Hence our study reinforces the importance of attending to the 
distribution of belief in occurrence ratings, as also done in Scoboria et al. (2014) and Scoboria, 
Talarico and Pascal (2015). 
Past and future events were obtained using a between-subjects procedure. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the stability of the measure when participants report about both past and 
future events, to determine if the factor structure is stable when obtaining within-subjects 
measurement of past and future events (see Study 2). 
Rehearsal ratings for future events were lower on average in Ernst and D’Argembeau 
(2017) than in the current study. The future events elicited in this study were rated fairly high on 
rehearsal, which, as previously noted, suggests that many of the future events may have 
previously been imagined/constructed and that participants may have retrieved memories of 
previously constructed future events (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2017; Szpunar, Addis, 
McLelland, & Schacter, 2013). Szpunar and Schacter (2013) found that repeated simulation of 
novel future events leads to future event representations becoming more detailed and perceived 
as more plausible. Hence the present study may have more to say about belief in occurrence for 
detailed and rehearsed future event representations. Future studies are needed in which the 
measure is applied to the development of belief in occurrence for novel future event simulations. 
It will be interesting to examine how belief in occurrence for future events develops over time, 
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which can potentially be accomplished with longitudinal use of the measure reported in this 
paper. The test-retest characteristics of the measure could also be assessed at such a time. The 
new measure could be used to observe patterns of change in belief in occurrence across repeated 
simulations of previously constructed and novel future events. 
Consistent with previous research (Rubin, Schrauf & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & 
Umanath, 2015; Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria, Pascal & Talarico, 2015), past distant and past 
recent events were characterized by regular rehearsal, strong mental simulation (visual, sensory, 
and spatial variables), autonoetic awareness, plausibility, and personal importance. In other 
words, these reports resembled other reports about vivid believed memories from the literature. 
Uncertain past events were rated as less frequently rehearsed, less personally important, and 
were associated with lower autonoetic awareness and lower mental simulation (visual, sensory, 
spatial). 
Near future events were rated higher than distant future events for all items except 
importance, in line with previous findings (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004). Distant and uncertain future events did not differ notably. This suggests that there 
may be little difference between the distant future events and uncertain future events collected in 
this study, which makes sense given that distant future events may typically be experienced as 
inherently uncertain. 
Study 2 Introduction 
The purposes of Study 2 were to replicate Study 1 when collecting data using a within-
subjects design in which participants reported and rated both a past and a future event, and to 
examine the generalizability of the measure when administered in French. 
Study 2 Method 
Participants 
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A total of 323 participants completed the study. Among these, 244 participants were 
recruited through the Prolific crowdsourcing platform, which is specifically tailored for research 
(https://www.prolific.ac/). Each Prolific participant received financial compensation of £2.50. The 
remaining 79 participants were recruited through forums or websites. Four participants were 
excluded due to the self-report of a current depression episode because depression can influence 
the phenomenological characteristics of memories and future thoughts (e.g., Anderson & Evans, 
2015). The validity of responses was checked (see Results), leaving 251 participants who provided 
a specific event for both the past and the future cues. Demographic characteristics for the final 
sample were: Mean age = 29.99 (SD = 9.86), range 17 to 58; gender 66.1% female, 32.7% male, 
1.2% not reported. 
Measures 
 Events were rated using French translations of the items used in Study 1: belief in 
occurrence (8 items), autonoetic awareness (4 items), spatial setting (4 items), and the single 
items: personal plausibility, visual detail, sensory detail, event importance and rehearsal (see 
Appendix A). All items were independently translated by two English-French translators. The 
two translations were then compared and discrepancies were resolved by discussion. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to produce two personal events, one for the past and one for the 
future (presented in a counterbalanced order). Instructions emphasized the importance of selecting 
specific and unique personal events, that is, events that are associated with a specific spatio-
temporal context and lasting no more than a day. Participants read general instructions about event 
selection and then briefly described and rated a recent past event (something that occurred in the 
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past year) and an event that might happen in the near future (in the next year). The event cueing 
procedure is detailed in Appendix C. 
Study 2 Results 
Event screening 
Prior to data analysis, the specificity of events was checked using the following criteria 
(Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011): an event was considered ‘specific’ if it referred to a 
unique event occurring at a particular time and place, and lasting no longer than a day. Repeated, 
extended or invalid events were considered ‘non-specific’. Non-specific events were excluded, 
leaving 273 past events and 258 future events. A random selection of 20% of transcripts was scored 
by a second independent rater. The raters agreed on event specificity for 98% of past cases and 
98% of future cases. Disagreements were resolved via discussion. Only participants who provided 
a specific event for both the past and the future were included, leaving 251 participants (and thus 
251 events per condition) for analysis. 
As in Study 1, CFA was used to simultaneously test the latent structure of belief in 
occurrence, spatial, and autonoetic judgments for the past and future events. Items were loaded 
onto belief in occurrence (8 items), spatial (4 items), and autonoetic (4 items) latent variables for 
each temporal direction, using the same approach and software as Study 1. No potentially 
problematic multivariate outliers were identified and all cases were retained. 
 For past events, this model was a strong fit to the data (robust CFI = .991; robust RMSEA 
= .017 [.001,.027]; SRMR = .064). Examination of factor loadings (see Table 6) indicated that 
nearly all items loaded strongly and statistically significantly on their respective latent variables. 
The loading for one belief in occurrence item was more modest at .40, but given that this item 
performed well in Study 1 and the current loading was statistically meaningful, the item was 
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retained. Furthermore, the belief item removed in Study 1 performed well in Study 2, with little 
difference in model fit with the item included or excluded. Examination of modification indices 
did not reveal any problematic items, and all eight items were retained. For future events, the 8 
item scale was a good fit to the data (robust CFI = .953; robust RMSEA = .021 [.00,.034]; 
SRMR = .047). The test of model equivalence indicated statically equivalent loadings of 
indicators on latent variables for the past and future events (ΔCFI = .001). 
 We added the single items covariates to the model (plausibility, rehearsal, visual, sensory, 
importance), which were permitted to correlate. Correlations between the latent variables are in 
Table 7, and correlations between the single items and latent variables are in Table 8. Consistent 
with Study 1, belief in occurrence for future events correlated positively with spatial 
characteristics, autonoetic awareness, plausibility, and importance, and did not correlate with the 
sensory or rehearsal items. Belief in occurrence for past events correlated positively with spatial 
characteristics, plausibility, visual detail, and importance; the sensory item did not correlate with 
past belief. 
Mean ratings for latent variables and single items covariates are provided in Figure 3. 
The expected ceiling effect for belief in occurrence ratings was present, which is not surprising 
given that we did not cue multiple event types or attempt to elicit a broader range of responses on 
belief in occurrence in Study 2. We remind that the robust estimation of model fit corrects for 
skewness in item distributions.  
Belief in occurrence for past events was rated higher on average than belief in occurrence 
for future events. Similar to Study 1, future events were rated above the mid-point on average on 
the rehearsal scale, indicating that many of the future events had been previously imagined and 
thought about. Both past and future events were rated as personally important, and high in 
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plausibility. Also as in Study 1, the pattern of differences between past and future events was 
consistent with prior findings (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004), with higher autonoetic, spatial, plausibility, sensory, and visual ratings on average for past 
events. The importance and rehearsal items did not differentiate past and future events. 
Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 produced a robust replication of the measurement structure from Study 1 for 
belief in occurrence, spatial characteristic, and autonoetic awareness latent variables for both past 
and future events. All eight belief in occurrence items loaded well in Study 2, which may be 
related to the reduced complexity of the models (the absence of multiple events). This shows that 
the measurement structure for past and future events in Study 1 were not an artifact of the 
between subjects design or the specific cueing procedure – the measure performed similarly 
when people rated only past, only future, or both past and future events. 
General discussion 
The current findings are largely consistent with the results of Ernst and D’Argembeau 
(2017), and support the notion that future event representations are characterized by degrees of 
belief that future events will genuinely come to occur. The current relations between future belief 
in occurrence, event plausibility, event importance, and spatial characteristics support their 
argument that belief in occurrence for future events is rooted in autobiographical knowledge. In 
other words, belief in occurrence for future events is rooted in the degree to which potential 
events fit with understanding of one’s self, expectations, goals and understanding of the world. 
This pattern of relations is similar, although not equivalent, for past events. Consistent with 
previous research, beliefs in past events are related to plausibility, spatial characteristics, and 
personal importance of events, suggesting that belief in occurrence for past and future events 
share substantially overlapping although not completely identical underlying processes. 
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These studies provide psychometrically improved measures for assessing belief in 
occurrence for past and future autobiographical events in English and French. The current 
research has emphasized internal consistency and construct representativeness. Future research is 
needed to establish additional psychometric properties of the measure, such as test-retest 
reliability and expanded convergent and divergent validity with other theoretically related and 
unrelated measures. 
Challenges with distributions of belief in occurrence scores 
 Belief in occurrence is typically conceptualized as a continuous variable, which can take 
any value ranging from very weak to very strong. However, as reviewed above, obtaining a 
distribution of events that vary in belief in occurrence scores that includes not-strongly-believed 
event representations requires the use of event cues that either produce greater variation in 
responses, or cues that elicit events that are known to be characterized by lower belief in 
occurrence (e.g., nonbelieved memories, “uncertain” events, or events that happened to others, or 
other types of “not-believed-not-remembered” events; Scoboria et al., 2014; Scoboria, Talarico 
& Pascal, 2015). 
 Given the nature of this skew, we are not able to rule out that some of the relations 
estimated between belief in occurrence and other variables (particularly when single items are 
used) in the current studies are not partly attenuated (Kowalski, 1972). However, the body of 
evidence suggests that the item distributions obtained when measuring belief in occurrence does 
not present a major problem. Belief in occurrence measures tend to perform as expected when 
skew is accounted for by using robust model fit procedures during structural modelling (e.g., 
Scoboria et al., 2014; current studies) and when belief in occurrence is experimentally 
manipulated (e.g., Scoboria, Otgaar, & Mazzoni & 2018). We recommend that researchers 
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consider event cueing methods with care when working with memories in general, and in 
particular with belief in occurrence. The fact that the expanded scale hangs together well 
suggests that the various forms of variance that contribute to belief in occurrence as a construct 
are being captured by the current items. 
Also important in examining the network of relations (Cronbach & Meehl, 1952) among 
the variables theorized to be relevant to understanding the experiences of autobiographical 
remembering and forecasting is considering whether all of the measures are of sufficient 
psychometric quality to reveal underlying relationships. In these studies, autonoetic awareness 
and spatial characteristics were modeled simultaneously with belief in occurrence, revealing 
consistent relationships across cueing procedures and temporal orientations. Given that the 
theory proposed by Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) emphasizes that belief in occurrence when 
associated with future episodic thought is grounded in self-knowledge, event plausibility, and the 
personal importance of events, future research will also need to incorporate more robust (rather 
than single item) measures of these concepts. To our knowledge, no well-established multiple 
item scales exist (but see Berntsen & Rubin, 2006, for a measure of how central an event is to a 
person’s identity and life story, and Svob, Brown et al., 2013, for a measure of the personal 
impact of events). A goal of future research might be to develop structural models of all relevant 
measurement components and to simultaneously test the fit of the scales. This is preferable to the 
approach often used in studies of event memory, where single items are included as covariates 
but are not formally incorporated in a more theoretically informed manner. 
Understanding belief in occurrence appraisals for future events requires understanding 
how people come to view future events as having greater or lesser subjective sense of certainty 
of eventual occurrence. The data from Ernst and D’Argembeau (2017) points to several ways of 
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approaching this question that can be incorporated into measurement in future research. First, 
when justifying belief for future events some of their participants referred to ‘commitment’ to 
engaging in the event, such as intentions to attend scheduled events such as weddings (on 
average, this type of justification was provided for 13% of future events). Presumably this event 
will occur (due to knowledge that weddings once scheduled tend to happen), unless 
unanticipated (and perhaps implausible) intervening factors arise that result in the cancellation of 
the event or an inability to attend. Stronger belief in the occurrence should motivate efforts to 
ensure that the event comes to pass, and this has interesting implications for planning and 
updating of plans to anticipate factors that might facilitate or prevent the occurrence of events.  
Furthermore, they found that participants frequently justified belief in future events in 
relation to personal goals (on average, this type of justification was provided for 41% of future 
events). The stronger the belief that a future event will occur, the more motivated a person may 
be to plan for and anticipate potential factors that might facilitate the occurrence of the event, 
and to anticipate factors that might prevent personally experiencing that event. Previous studies 
have shown that personal goals play an important role in guiding the construction of episodic 
future thoughts (D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011) and in organizing imagined events in coherent 
themes and causal sequences (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). Goals may also be closely 
related to belief in occurrence and this relation might be bidirectional: events that are related to 
goals may feel more “real” because one strives to achieve them (and thus one might have a sense 
of control over their occurrence) and, reciprocally, one might be more motivated to attain and 
plan for goal-related events because they feel more “real”. 
Conceptualizing belief in the past and in the future 
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In both studies, the structural modelling, in addition to revealing robust belief in 
occurrence components for past and future thinking, also indicated that the same variables were 
involved in predicting belief in occurrence in both temporal directions. The relations for past and 
future belief in occurrence were similar for three items: personal plausibility, spatial 
characteristics, and personal importance of events. This reveals how beliefs in both past and 
future events tap onto autobiographical knowledge and the appraisal of one’s self, which include 
expectations, goals and most likely a more general understanding of the world. Past and future 
thinking might share substantially the same type of information, and at least partially overlapping 
processes (McDermott & Gilmore, 2015; Schacter et al., 2017; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). 
The integration of represented events with autobiographical knowledge is clearly a factor that 
could account (at least in part) for the commonality between past and future in terms of belief in 
occurrence. However, the overlap is not and cannot be complete as future thinking relies on 
mental simulation, imagination, and constructive processes to a greater extent than remembering.  
In addition, the experience of envisioning future events is characterized by an 
unknowability and degree of uncertainty that typically does not apply to the experience of 
remembering the past. Ideas about ‘veridicality’ and ‘accuracy’ must be different between past 
and future events, as future events cannot be subjected to verification in the same manners that 
past events have the potential to be. Future simulation presumably also involves to a greater 
extent intentional cognitive appraisals of the relevance of future scenarios to the self and to 
personal goals. Future events might also be conceived as being of greater importance compared 
with past events (see also Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). Any 
type of past event can come to mind, from the most trivial to the most significant for the 
individual. Although importance of future events can vary substantially, in the current studies 
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people tended to report more significant future events, as indicated by event importance and 
rehearsal ratings. 
Mental Simulation and Belief in Occurrence 
There is good consensus in the literature around the notion of ‘mental simulation’ or what 
some term ‘scene construction’ as a core component of remembering and future thought3 
(Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Mental 
simulation refers to the capacity to form mental imagery of specific scenarios for a variety of 
purposes, such as imagining, remembering, or planning for the future. We note that we included 
items for ‘visual’ and ‘sensory’ detail in the current studies with mental simulation in mind. We 
did explore whether these two items might be included in the SEM models as a ‘perceptual’ 
factor that would contribute to a mental simulation construct. We found that including this two-
item factor rendered the SEM model unidentifiable. However, ideally there would be three or 
more items for the scale, which is the most likely explanation for our inability to fit this 
additional latent variable within our models. Adding additional items related to mental 
simulation and perceptual features in future studies is likely to reveal this factor, given that 
similar scales have been developed (e.g., Sutin & Robins, 2007). 
Notwithstanding this limitation in measuring a mental simulation construct, the present 
results clearly show that mental simulation and belief in occurrence are distinct aspects of 
episodic future thought. This finding is consistent with the view that the construction of specific 
event representations is an important but insufficient component of episodic future thinking: for 
an imagined event to be felt as truly belonging to one’s personal future, it has to be meaningfully 
linked to autobiographical knowledge (D’Argembeau, 2016). The essence of episodic future 
                                                            
3 We do not imply equivalence between ‘mental simulation’ and ‘scene construction’, but to elaborate on the 
distinction would take the discussion in a direction not necessary for the paper. 
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thinking might thus lie at the conjunction of two components: mental simulation and the 
integration of imagined events in an autobiographical context. In other words, a key difference 
between episodic future thoughts and the imagination of fictitious, or atemporal scenes (de Vito 
et al., 2012) is that the former are meaningfully related to personal goals and/or general 
expectations about the self and one’s life. The ensuing sense of “realness” when imagining 
events may in turn play an important role in goal pursuit, for example by increasing motivation 
and guiding actions toward desired future states (Baumeister et al., 2016). 
Novel versus rehearsed Future Event Representations 
 As noted in both studies, rehearsal ratings were high for future events. This points to 
another challenge with eliciting and characterizing future event representations – the degree to 
which they have been previously constructed. There are relevant distinctions between novel, 
partial, well rehearsed, and even perhaps over-rehearsed images for future events (see Ingvar, 
1985, for an early discussion of memory for the contents of future simulations or “memories of 
the future,” and see Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2017; Szpunar et al., 2013, for more recent 
findings). Another issue is the degree to which future event representations provided during 
studies such as these are formed spontaneously at the time of cueing, or whether they are 
retrieved more intentionally and planfully. 
 This issue is relevant when considering whether over-rehearsed future event 
representations might result in problems. Given notions that problem gamblers sometimes 
become convinced that they are “due a win” (Delfabbro, Lahn & Gabrosky, 2006) which 
contribute to a sense that a win in the future is inevitable, Scoboria and Wilson (2011) proposed 
that problem gambling behavior might be influenced by the development of vivid, believed false 
mental simulations for future gambling outcomes (which they speculated may even be 
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experienced as ‘memories for future wins’). They found that a sample of problem gamblers rated 
belief in occurrence for future gambling wins as higher than future gambling losses, despite the 
fact that losses are the more likely outcome. Additionally, belief and memory for future wins 
correlated positively with frequency of gambling and positive gambling expectancies, whereas 
belief and memory for future losses correlated with negative outcome expectancies and problem 
gambling risk. Hence one question is whether overly rehearsed and overly believed future event 
representations might promote and reinforce psychopathology.  
Future event representations play a role in a variety of mental health disorders (for a 
recent meta-analysis, see Hallford, Austin, Takano, & Raes, 2018). Many of the anxiety 
disorders are characterized by rumination about potential future events. Examples include 
visualization and anticipation of scenarios in which a panic attack might occur (panic disorder, 
simple phobias), or envisioning how others will engage in social shaming (social anxiety 
disorder) (see Milyoan, Bulley & Suddendorf, 2015; and see Hackmann & Holmes, 2004, for a 
discussion of intrusive prospective imagery across a variety of forms of psychopathology, 
Holmes & Mathews, 2010, for a review of mental imagery in emotional disorders, and Pearson, 
Naselaris, Holmes & Kosslyn, 2015, for a review of mental imagery that includes discussion of 
future prospection in clinical disorders). An interesting question for future research would be to 
assess whether belief in occurrence contributes to the individual’s emotional responses when 
envisioning such future events. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the current studies advance conceptual understanding of the nature of 
belief in occurrence judgments for mental representations of past and future autobiographical 
events. The studies provide a psychometrically sound, conceptually broader measure of belief in 
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occurrence, which advances the validity of the concept (see Scoboria et al., 2014 for belief in 
occurrence applied to the past, and Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017, for belief in occurrence for 
episodic future thought). Our results also suggest that the integration of events within 
autobiographical knowledge is an important factor for determining belief in occurrence for past 
and future events. An important avenue for future research would be to assess the predictive 
validity of our belief measure (Miloyan & MacFarlane, in press): although the future is 
fundamentally unknowable, people may have some ability to predict what will actually transpire, 
which may be reflected (at least in part) in their belief in future occurrence. This proposition 
could be tested by examining whether degrees of belief are related to the subsequent occurrence 
of imagined events.  
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Past 330  282 287 296 233 
Future 334  308 277 290 237 
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Table 2. Study 1, Loadings of indicators on latent variables. 
 
  Past Events Future Events 
Latent variable Item Uncertain Distant Recent Uncertain Distant Recent 
Belief in  
occurrence 
b1 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.79 
b2 0.88 0.82 0.62 0.85 0.88 0.85 
b3 0.91 0.86 0.74 0.84 0.87 0.74 
b4 0.77 0.75 0.58 0.84 0.85 0.79 
b5 0.91 0.86 0.78 0.92 0.93 0.88 
b6 0.86 0.86 0.76 0.87 0.92 0.90 
b8 0.80 0.83 0.68 0.86 0.91 0.81 
Spatial sett 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.82 
 spat 0.73 0.80 0.60 0.85 0.82 0.67 
 loc1 0.87 0.90 0.80 0.91 0.95 0.91 
 loc2 0.84 0.88 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.83 
Autonoetic 
awareness 
rel 0.83 0.87 0.76 0.83 0.84 0.65 
rxp 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.84 
mtt1 0.74 0.82 0.69 0.78 0.88 0.76 
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Table 3. Study 1, Correlations between LVs, Past events. 
 
 
 Uncertain Recent Distant 
  Belief Spatial Auto Belief Spatial Auto Belief Spatial Auto 
Uncertain Belief 1 0.24 0.10 0.35 0.23 -0.11 0.42 0.01 -0.10 
 Spatial  1 0.67 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.11 
 Auto   1 -0.15 -0.06 0.33 -0.10 0.22 0.40 
Recent Belief    1 0.73 0.16 0.89 0.25 0.07 
 Spatial     1 0.42 0.60 0.28 0.14 
 Auto      1 0.09 0.26 0.58 
Distant Belief      1 0.37 0.16 
 Spatial        1 0.77 
 Auto        1 Note: Statistically significant correlations are indicated in bold (p < .05). Auto – Autonoetic awareness. Belief – 
Belief in occurrence. 
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Table 4. Study 1, Correlations between LVs, Future events. 
 
 
 Uncertain Recent Distant 
  Belief Spatial Auto Belief Spatial Auto Belief Spatial Auto 
Uncertain Belief 1 0.29 0.46 0.16 0.20 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.17 
 Spatial  1 0.81 0.01 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.38 0.29 
 Auto   1 0.02 0.17 0.42 0.20 0.33 0.50 
Recent Belief    1 0.49 0.35 0.13 -0.06 -0.05 
 Spatial     1 0.49 0.36 0.22 0.17 
 Auto      1 0.50 0.27 0.49 
Distant Belief       1 0.36 0.50 
 Spatial        1 0.82 
 Auto        1 
Note: Statistically significant correlations are indicated in bold (p < .05).  
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Table 5. Study 1, Correlations between latent variable and single item predictors.  
 
  Plausibility Visual Sensory Importance Rehearsal 
Variable Event Past Future Past Future Past Future Past Future Past Future 
Belief Distant 0.66 0.66 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.29 0.04 0.05  Recent 0.46 0.60 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.07 0.09 
 Uncertain 0.66 0.65 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.11 
Spatial Distant 0.08 0.06 0.62 0.75 0.42 0.42 0.06 -0.09 0.19 0.15 
Recent 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.63 0.31 0.32 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.08 
Uncertain 0.06 0.01 0.68 0.77 0.46 0.44 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.02 
Autonoetic Distant -0.02 0.11 0.52 0.64 0.45 0.45 0.24 0.02 0.24 0.20 
Recent -0.02 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.41 0.43 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.14 
Uncertain -0.04 0.09 0.61 0.65 0.49 0.50 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.14 
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Table 6. Study 2, Loadings of indicators on latent variables. 
 
Latent variable Item Past Future 
Belief in  
occurrence 
b1 0.67 0.83 
b2 0.73 0.84 
b3 0.79 0.87 
b4 0.62 0.86 
b5 0.70 0.89 
b6 0.72 0.84 
b7 0.78 0.88 
b8 0.40 0.79 
Spatial spatial 0.60 0.74 
 loc1 0.76 0.89 
 loc2 0.84 0.94 
 loc3 0.80 0.86 
Autonoetic 
awareness 
rel 0.77 0.87 
rxp 0.81 0.75 
mtt1 0.72 0.79 
mtt2 0.76 0.86 
All loadings are statistically significant at p < .001. 
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Table 7. Study 2, correlations between LVs. 
 
 Past Future 
  
Belief Spatial Auto Belief Spatial Auto 
Past Belief 1 .60 .23 .33 .10 -.02 
 
Spatial  1 .44 .34 .27 .16 
 
Autonoetic   1 .10 .35 .51 
Future Belief    1 .31 .31 
 
Spatial     1 .64 
 
Autonoetic      1 
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Table 8. Study 2, Correlations between latent variable and single item predictors.  
Latent variable Plausibility Visual Sensory Importance Rehearsal 
Past Belief .56 .21 .06 .20 -.04 
 Spatial .34 .42 .25 .16 .01 
 Autonoetic .03 .32 .37 .20 .17 
Future Belief .62 .12 .19 .28 .09 
 Spatial .02 .75 .27 .18 .06 
Autonoetic .01 .48 .44 .30 .14 
Bold correlations are significant at p < .05.  
  




Figure 1. Graphical depiction of the Future Recent event component of the model, including the belief in 
occurrence, spatial, and autonoetic awareness latent variables. The tables provide data on the identically and 
simultaneously modeled Past Distant, Past Recent, Past Uncertain, Future Distant, and Future Uncertain events. 
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Figure 2. Study 1, Average ratings for past and future events by event type. 
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Figure 3. Study 2, Average ratings for past and future events. 
 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals on the means. 
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Appendix A. Items used to rate events. 
 




How likely is it that you personally 
did in fact experience this event?  
1 Definitely did not happen; 7 
Definitely happened 
How likely is it that you personally 
will in fact experience this event?  
1 Definitely will not happen; 7 
Definitely will happen 
Scoboria et al. 
(2004) 
 
Dans quelle mesure avez-vous 
réellement fait (ferez-vous réellement) 
l’expérience de cet événement ? (1 = il 
ne s’est certainement pas produit (il ne se 
produira certainement pas), 7= il s’est 
produit de manière certaine (il se 




It is true that this event occurred to 
me.  
1 Not at all true; 7 Extremely true 
It is true that this event will occur to 
me.  
1 Not at all true; 7 Extremely true 
Scoboria et al 
(2014) 
Cet événement m’est arrivé (va vraiment 





How strong is your belief that this 
event actually occurred?  
1 No belief, 7 Strong belief 
How strong is your belief that this 
event will actually occur?  
1 No belief, 7 Strong belief 
Scoboria et al. 
(2014) 
Quel est votre degré de conviction dans le 
fait que cet événement s’est réellement 
produit (va réellement se produire) ? 





While remembering this event, I 
feel that it actually occurred 
1 not at all, 7 very strongly 
While imagining this event, I feel 
that it will actually occur 




En me rappelant (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, j’ai le sentiment qu’il a 
réellement eu lieu (va réellement avoir 




I feel that this event really 
happened to me 
1 No feeling; 7 strong feeling 
I feel that this event will really 
happen to me 
1 No feeling; 7 strong feeling 
New item: 
emphasis on 
feeling of belief 
J’ai le sentiment que cet événement m’est 
vraiment arrivé (va vraiment m’arriver) 




Whether or not I can visualize this 
event clearly, I believe the event 
actually happened to me.  
1 Not at all, 7 Very much 
Whether or not I can visualize this 
event clearly, I believe the event 
will actually happen to me. 1 Not at 
all, 7 Very much 
New item:  
emphasis on 
belief, regardless 
of clarity of 
mental 
simulation. 
Que j’arrive ou non à visualiser 
clairement cet événement, j’ai la 
conviction qu’il m’est vraiment arrivé 
(va vraiment m’arriver) : (1 = pas du 




I believe this event really occurred. 
1 Definitely did not occur; 7 
Definitely occurred 
I believe this event will really 
occur. 
1 Definitely will not occur; 7 
Definitely will occur 
New item J’ai la conviction que cet événement 
s’est réellement produit (va réellement se 
produire) : (1= il ne s’est certainement 
pas produit (ne se produira certainement 
pas), 7 = il s’est produit de façon certaine 
(il se produira de façon certaine) 





I believe that this event actually 
occurred to me, even if the details 
that I remember is not completely 
accurate.  
1 Not at all, 7 Very much 
I believe that this event will 
actually occur to me, even if the 
details that I imagine will not be 
completely accurate.  
1 Not at all, 7 Very much 





J'ai la conviction que cet événement 
m’est vraiment arrivé (va vraiment 
m’arriver), même si les détails dont je 
me rappelle ne sont pas (que j’imagine 
ne seront pas) nécessairement tout à fait 




How plausible is it that you 
personally could have experienced 
this event? 
1 Not at all plausible, 7 Extremely 
plausible 
How plausible is it that you 
personally could experience this 
event? 
1 Not at all plausible, 7 Extremely 
plausible 
Scoboria et al. 
(2004) 
Dans quelle mesure est-il plausible que 
vous, personnellement, ayez vécu (serez 
amené à vivre) cet événement ? (1 = pas 
du tout plausible, 7 = très plausible) 
Visual When I think about this event it 
involves visual details:  
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
When I think about this event it 
involves visual details: 
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
Numerous En me rappelant de (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, il inclut des détails visuels : 
(1 = pas du tout, 7 = énormément) 
Spatial 1 
(Sensory) 
My representation of this event 
contains sensory details (I can see, 
hear or perceive what happened)  
1 Not a lot; 7 A lot 
My representation of this event 
contains sensory details (I can see, 
hear or perceive what will happen) 




Ma représentation de cet événement 
comporte des détails sensoriels (je peux 
voir, entendre ou percevoir ce qui s’est 




As I think about the event, I can 
visualize the setting where it 
occurred.  
1 Vague; 7 Clear distinct 
As I think about the event, I can 
visualize the setting where it will 
occur.  
1 Vague; 7 Clear distinct 
Numerous Lorsque je pense à cet événement, je vois 
le lieu où il s’est produit (va se 





When I think about this event, the 
location where the event takes place 
is: 
1 Vague; 7 Clear distinct 
When I think about this event, the 
location where the event takes place 
is: 
1 Vague; 7 Clear distinct 
Numerous En me rappelant de (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, le lieu où il a eu lieu (va avoir 




As I think about this event, I can 
see the location/ setting where it 
took place  
1 Not at all; 7 Extremely clear 
As I think about this event, I can 
see the location/ setting where it 
will take place  




 En me rappelant de (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, le cadre/l’environnement où 
il a eu lieu (va avoir lieu) est : (1 = vague, 
7 = très clair) 
Objects/ 
People 
When I think about this event, the 
relative spatial arrangement of 
objects and people are:  
1 Vague; 7 Clear/distinct 
When I think about this event, the 
relative spatial arrangement of 
objects and people are: 
1 Vague; 7 Clear distinct 
Numerous En me rappelant de cet événement, la 
configuration spatiale des objets ou des 






As I think about the event, I feel 
that I travel back to the time when it 
happened, that I am a subject in it, 
As I think about the event, I feel 
that I travel forward to the time 
when it will happen, that I am a 
Numerous En me rappelant de (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, j’ai le sentiment de voyager 
dans le temps jusqu’au moment où cet 
événement s’est produit (se produira) et 
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rather than an outside observer tied 
to the present:  
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
subject in it, rather than an outside 
observer tied to the present: 
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
d'en faire pleinement partie, plutôt que 
de l'observer de l'extérieur depuis le 






While thinking about this event, I 
feel that I travel back in time and 
that I am right at the moment when 
this event happened 1 Not at all; 7 
Absolutely 
While thinking about this event, I 
feel that I travel forward in time 
and that I am right at the moment 
when this event will happen  




En me rappelant de (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, j’ai l’impression de retourner 
dans le passé (d’aller dans le futur) et de 
me retrouver (trouver) au moment où cet 
événement s’est produit (se produira) (1 = 




As I think about the event, I feel as 
though I am re-living the event: 
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
As I think about the event, I feel as 
though I am pre-living the event:  
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
Numerous En me rappelant de (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, j’ai comme le sentiment de 
revivre (vivre) cet événement : (1 = pas 





While thinking about this event, I 
feel that I am re-experiencing the 
situation, as if I was there  
1 Not at all; 7 Very strongly 
While thinking about this event, I 
feel that I am experiencing the 
situation, as if I was there  




En me rappelant (en m’imaginant) cet 
événement, j’ai le sentiment de revivre 
(vivre) l’événement comme si j’y étais (1 
= pas du tout, 7 = très fortement) 
Importance This event is important to me (in 
relation to my goals, my values, and 
so on)  
1 Not at all important; 7 Very 
important 
This event is important to me (in 
relation to my goals, my values, and 
so on) 
1 Not at all important; 7 Very 
important 
Numerous Cet événement est un moment important 
pour moi, par rapport à mes buts, mes 
valeurs, etc. (1 = pas du tout important, 7 
= très important) 
Rehearsal I have thought or talked about this 
event before: 
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
I have thought or talked about this 
event before: 
1 Not at all; 7 Very much 
Numerous J’ai déjà pensé à ou parlé de cet 
événement avant de l’évoquer 
aujourd’hui (1 = jamais, 7 = très souvent) 
Objective 
distance 
How far in the past did this event 
occur?  
(Text box) 
How far in the future will this event 
occur?  
(Text box) 
 Not measured in Study 2. 
 




Study 1 – English, event cueing procedure 
 
Past events 
 “You will be asked to think of a number of EVENTS from your past. By ‘‘Event’’ we mean any story or scene that 
can occur at a particular time and in a specific place. Events usually last for minutes or hours and no more than a 
single day. A box will appear where you will type a short description of this event. All of the events should be 
different. Please do not record any proper names (for people or places) or other information that would let us know 
who you are – use an initial if necessary. We would like you to record the first event that comes to mind for each 
prompt. After each prompt you will be asked to make ratings about the event. The event may or may not have been 
significant to you. You also may or may not have thought much about the event since it happened, it does not 
matter. You may or may not have discussed this past event with other people. We are interested in any and all 
personally-experienced events that have happened in your past.” 
 
Past recent event: “Please select an event that you recall from within the past year. Please provide a brief description  
of the event in the box below. Do not include any personally identifying information in your description.” 
 
Past uncertain event: “Please think about a past event for which you are uncertain about what you remember. This 
might mean that you are not certain about all of the details that you recall, that something seems to be missing from 
what you remember, that something is just not quite right about the memory, or you may not be sure that the event 
occurred at all.” 
 
Past distant event: “Please select a different event, one that you recall from five to ten years ago. Please provide a 




You will be asked to think of a number of EVENTS from your future. By ‘‘Event’’ we mean any story or scene that 
can occur at a particular time and in a specific place. Events usually last for minutes or hours and no more than a 
single day. A box will appear where you will type a short description of this event. All of the events should be 
different and unique (do not report routine or repeated events). Please do not record any proper names (for people or 
places) or other information that would let us know who you are – use an initial if necessary. We would like you to 
record the first event that comes to mind for each prompt. After each prompt you will be asked to make ratings 
about the event. The event may or may not be significant to you. You also may or may not have thought about this 
event happening in the future, it does not matter. You may or may not have discussed this future event with other 
people. We are interested in any and all personally-experienced events that may happen in your future. 
 
Future recent event: Please imagine an event that might occur within the next year. Please provide a brief description 
of the event in the box below. Do not include any personally identifying information in your description.  
 
Future uncertain event: Please think about a future event for which you are uncertain about what you imagine. This 
means you are not certain about all the details you think about, that something seems to be missing from this future 
scenario, that something is just not quite right about the scene, or you may not be sure that the event will occur at all.  
 
Future distant event: Please imagine an event that might occur in five to ten years time. Please provide a brief 
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Appendix C  
 
Study 2 – French, event cueing procedure 
 
Past events 
Nous vous demandons de penser à un événement personnel de votre passé, qui a eu lieu au cours des 12 derniers 
mois.  
 
Il doit s'agir d'un événement passé spécifique, qui s'est produit à un moment et dans un endroit précis. Cet 
événement peut avoir duré quelques minutes ou quelques heures, mais s'est déroulé au maximum sur une journée. 
Par exemple, « ma semaine de vacances à Paris » n’est pas un événement précis. En revanche, « la visite du Louvre 
» est un moment spécifique. 
Cet événement doit être unique et ne doit pas correspondre à quelque chose de routinier ou d'habituel pour vous. Par 
exemple, « je vais à la piscine tous les mercredis » est routinier. Par contre, « le passage de mon brevet de natation 
» est un moment unique. 
Une fois cet événement passé sélectionné, veuillez en donner ci-dessous une brève description et répondre à une 
série de questions le concernant.  
Note : certaines questions vous paraitront peut être plus ou moins semblables. Dans tous les cas, répondez de façon 
distincte à chaque question. Ce qui nous intéresse est votre réponse pour chaque question individuellement.   
 
Décrivez brièvement cet événement passé spécifique et unique dans la zone ci-dessous.  
Afin de garantir votre anonymat, mentionnez les personnes ou les lieux par des initiales si nécessaire et évitez 
l'évocation de tout élément qui pourrait permettre de vous identifier. 
 
Future events 
Nous vous demandons de penser à un événement personnel de votre futur, qui pourrait avoir lieu au cours des 12 
prochains mois. 
Il doit s'agir d'un événement futur spécifique, qui se produit à un moment et dans un endroit précis. Cet événement 
peut durer quelques minutes ou quelques heures, mais doit se dérouler au maximum sur une journée. Par exemple, « 
ma semaine de vacances à Paris » n’est pas un événement précis. En revanche, « la visite du Louvre » est un 
moment spécifique. 
 Cet événement doit être unique et ne doit pas correspondre à quelque chose de routinier ou d'habituel pour vous. Par 
exemple, « je vais à la piscine tous les mercredis » est routinier. Par contre, « le passage de mon brevet de natation 
» est un moment unique. 
 Une fois cet événement futur sélectionné, veuillez en donner ci-dessous une brève description et répondre à une 
série de questions le concernant. 
 Note : certaines questions vous paraitront peut être plus ou moins semblables. Dans tous les cas, répondez de façon 
distincte à chaque question. Ce qui nous intéresse est votre réponse pour chaque question individuellement.  
Décrivez brièvement cet événement futur spécifique et unique dans la zone ci-dessous.  
 
Afin de garantir votre anonymat, mentionnez les personnes ou les lieux par des initiales si nécessaire et évitez 
l'évocation de tout élément qui pourrait permettre de vous identifier. 
 
 
 
